Costs Premiums Back from the Dead

Addendum: Since our commentary on this case, Justice Gonsolus has released supplementary reasons on the issue of the costs premium. His Honour did not disturb the premium of $12,358 that he originally awarded. Instead, he revised the basis of the premium.

His Honour said that “I realize that in my comments concerning cost premiums, I have inadvertently misstated the general principles established by the case law. I wish to correct my error, or in the very least, my lack of clarity in relation to the case law”. His Honour proceeded to state, unequivocally, that “[a] cost premium cannot be awarded based upon risk.”

As we noted in our original post, the law seems fairly clear, that “risk premiums” cannot be part of an award of costs between parties. The premium that was originally awarded by Justice Gunsolus certainly seemed to have been based on the risk assumed by counsel for the plaintiff: “It is to be noted that counsel for the plaintiff, insofar as the plaintiff was left without the financial resources necessary to take this matter to trial, were required to fund the entire litigation without retainer. They further funded all disbursements and therefore undertook a substantial financial risk on behalf of the plaintiff. A review of all the principles relevant to justify a premium cost award justifies such an award in this case.”

As noted above, in his supplementary reasons, Justice Gunsolus acknowledged that the law does not permit risk premiums. However, he went on to say that “[a] premium is allowed in order to recognize permissible Rule 57.01 factors such as outstanding results achieved, the complexity of the matter and the importance of the issue.” Applying the criteria set out in R. 57.01 (such things as result achieved, importance of the issues, etc.), His Honour concluded that a premium was warranted here. He cited R. v. Maria Berendsen in support of his conclusion. That case, in turn, relied upon the Court of Appeal’s decision in Sandhu v. Wellington Apartments. In Maria Berendsen, a costs premium of $50,000 was given “in recognition of the complexity and importance of the issues”. In Sandhu, the Court of Appeal reduced by $300,000 a $350,000 premium that had been awarded at trial, although rather than express its disposition in terms of a “premium”, the Court of Appeal said, “In other words, the appellants are entitled to recover from the appellants $50,000 over and above the amount agreed to by the parties in the Minutes of Settlement.” 

Thus, it appears that some courts are still willing to apply the factors enumerated in Rule 57.01 in order to justify a costs premium, but only in recognition of those factors, not that of risk.

Our original post follows:

In Pate v. Galway, Mr. Justice Drew Gunsolus has resurrected a concept that we haven’t seen in quite a while: premiums on awards of costs. The underlying decision (those reasons appear here) was a wrongful dismissal case that began more than ten years ago. The plaintiff was ultimately awarded damages of about $131,000. (The damages were of various sorts: general, special, Wallace, punitive and aggravated. The trial went particularly badly for the defence: Justice Gunsolus, after totalling up the damages, said, “I would order more, however, I am bound by the principles of proportionality.”)

Counsel for the plaintiff sought a 20% “risk premium” on costs, to reflect the fact that the law firm had funded both fees and disbursements in getting to trial and so, had assumed a considerable risk. Although no offers to settle had been made by either side, Justice Gunsolus awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis, “[t]aking into consideration the success of the plaintiff in this matter and the conduct of the defendant.”

He then turned to the issue of the costs premium. He concluded that such a premium “is available when substantial indemnity costs are awarded” and cited as authority Sandhu v. Wellington Place Apartments. Since he had awarded costs on the substantial indemnity scale, he considered that he was free to give a 20% premium and did so. He calculated 20% of the total of the fees, disbursements and GST and added that amount to the costs award. This increased the costs from $61,791 (fees, disbursements and GST) to $74,149.

It is true that a costs premium was given in Sandhu, which was decided in 2006. However, later that year, the Supreme Court of Canada decided Walker v. Ritchie and struck down a “risk premium” on the basis that “The risk of non‑payment to the plaintiffs’ lawyer was not a relevant factor under the costs scheme in Rule 57.01(1) of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure at the time costs were fixed in this case.” At paragraph 30 of the Supreme Court’s reasons, the Court said that there was “no basis for a difference in approach to the issue of a risk premium as between an award of partial or substantial indemnity costs”. On the basis of Walker, the costs premium in Sandhu was overturned by the Court of Appeal in 2008.

Rule 57.01 has been amended since Walker and it was thought for a while that the case might be distinguishable on that basis. However, the Court of Appeal held, in Ward v. The Manufacturers Life Insurance Company, that “the concerns underlying the decision in Walker apply equally to the new language of Rule 57.01″.

We haven’t heard much about risk premiums since then. It seems to us that Justice Gunsolus is mistaken in his statement, that such premiums are available where costs are awarded on a substantial indemnity basis.

Oddly, His Honour was aware of the Supreme Court’s decision in Walker v. Ritchie as it is cited in a footnote.

Justice Gunsolus also awarded prejudgment interest at 5.3% per annum, for 10.67 years. (Although 5.3% was the appropriate rate for a proceeding commenced in the first quarter of 1999, it is striking that that is more than ten times the rate of interest provided for at present by the Courts of Justice Act. Given that His Honour specifically mentioned that the defendant had “had the benefit of these funds for the 10.67 year period”, we would have thought that some consideration might have been given to averaging the rates over the last ten and a half years.)

In addition, His Honour does not appear to have calculated interest (on special damages, at least) at the end of each six-month period, as required by s. 128(3) of the Courts of Justice Act or to have used the shorthand approach, endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Borland v. Muttersbach, of applying one-half the rate otherwise applicable.

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Master MacLeod Says “Litigation Finger” Can Point at Two Parties Simultaneously

In Suarez v. Minto Developments Inc., Master Calum MacLeod addressed a couple of interesting issues in the law of misnomer. (This principle has received increased attention over the last couple of years, perhaps because the disappearance of “special circumstances” as a basis for extending a limitation period has caused practitioners and the judiciary to look for other ways to avoid prescription. Misnomer has been specifically preserved in the Limitations Act, 2002 in s.  21(2).)

In Suarez, the plaintiff slipped on a plastic sheet that had been placed on the carpet of his home by some workmen. He fell down some stairs and injured himself. He did not know the name of the flooring contractor nor that of the negligent employee and so, named “John Doe” as a defendant in the statement of claim. In the course of examining another (identified) defendant for discovery, counsel for the plaintiff learned that the unidentified flooring contractor was “Tag Drywall (11009)” and the employee in question was one “Edgar Cronorel”. The plaintiff moved to replace John Doe with Tag Drywall (11009) and Edgar Cronorel.

Recall that the test in misnomer cases is the so-called “litigating finger” (or “litigation finger”, as Master MacLeod referred to it). The test is this: would a person having knowledge of the facts be aware of the true identity of a misnamed party by reading the statement of claim? Would he or she know from the statement of claim, that the “litigating finger” was pointing at him or her?

Master MacLeod had no difficulty in finding that the litigation finger was pointing at Tag Drywall. What caused him more concern was whether that same finger could be said to have been pointing at the employee Cronorel as well. He concluded that it could:

Without attempting to lay down a general principle, I am of the view that in this case John Doe was a generic description intended to refer to the person who did the work at the home and any legal entity responsible for that work whatever relationship the person or entity had with Minto [the general contractor]. That is obvious from the statement of claim on its plain and ordinary meaning.

The Master went on to address the argument that Cronorel was not in Canada and might be prejudiced because he appears not to have known of the claim. Master MacLeod said: “Providing this is correction of a misnomer and not addition of a party beyond the limitation period it is not relevant when the moving party first became aware of the name and could have brought the motion and the presumption of prejudice raised by the passing of the limitation period does not apply.”

We think that he was quite correct in the view that he took of prejudice in the context of misnomer. By definition, a finding of misnomer involves the nunc pro tunc replacement of a party who has been misnamed in the originating process. The party has sued or been sued on the date of issuance, but has simply been misnamed. Whether or not the correction of the misnomer results in “prejudice” to the correctly-named party should be of no more relevance than if he or she had been named properly in the first instance.

Yet the jurisprudence has not followed that approach. To begin with, subrule 5.04(2), which deals with the addition of parties, explicitly makes “prejudice” a factor:

At any stage of a proceeding the court may by order add, delete or substitute a party or correct the name of a party incorrectly named, on such terms as are just, unless prejudice would result that could not be compensated for by costs or an adjournment.

Master MacLeod’s reasons do not indicate the rule under which the motion was brought in Suarez, but subrule 5.05(2) is typically relied upon in such cases.

In Mazzuca v. Silvercreek Pharmacy, the Court of Appeal, in speaking of subrule 5.04(2), seemed to accept that evidence of non-compensable prejudice could defeat a motion to add a defendant on the basis of misnomer:

This language addresses misnomer situations and, in the absence of non-compensable prejudice, permits an amendment where it was intended to commence proceedings in one name but, in error, the proceedings were commenced in another name.

In our opinion, prejudice should be irrelevant where misnomer has been made out.

We also think that Master MacLeod had it right in finding that a single litigating finger can point at more than one party. One of us actually made this argument recently, but without success. In Bremer v. Foisy, one of Master Robert Beaudoin’s  last decisions before his appointment as a judge of the Superior Court, the issue of misnomer arose. This was a personal injury action arising out of an MVA. The police report and other evidence indicated that Foisy, the driver who had caused the accident, was also the owner of his car. So, the lawyer for the plaintiff commenced action naming Foisy as owner and driver and describing him as such in the statement of claim.

More than two years after the accident, it was discovered that in fact, Foisy’s car had been leased from GMAC Leaseco. On a motion to add GMAC as a defendant, we argued that the “litigating finger” pointed at both Foisy (as driver) and GMAC Leaseco (as owner). We submitted that the plaintiff’s lawyer had sued Foisy in both capacities, but it turned out that Foisy had been mistakenly named as owner.

Although Master Beaudoin (as he then was) allowed the motion to add GMAC (on the basis of discoverability), he rejected the misnomer argument. The fact that Foisy would have remained as a defendant (as driver) and GMAC would have been added as owner seemed to be of significance to the Master:

More importantly this is not a case of correcting the name of a party that has been incorrectly named; the Plaintiffs seek to add a party. They do not abandon their claim against Foisy. Leaseco and Foisy are both necessary parties in the light of the provisions of 192 of the Highway Traffic Act R.S.O. 1990 c. H. 8 that expose both the operator and the owner of a motor vehicle to a liability in the event of a motor vehicle accident. There may have been a mistake in this case but it is of an entirely different nature. In my view, that mistake is more appropriately applied in the context of the discoverability issue.

While we will take a win however we can get it, it seems to us that the approach taken by Master MacLeod in Suarez would have supported the addition of GMAC as a defendant in Bremer, on the ground of misnomer. If an action is commenced against an individual in two capacities but, unknown to the plaintiff’s lawyer, someone else holds one of those two capacities, how is that any different from suing “the emergency room doctor” by naming “Dr. John Doe”? Assuming that the allegations in the statement of claim contain the necessary details, they would make it just as clear to the correct defendant, that he, she or it was the person to whom the litigating finger was pointing.

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Sidewalk Height Discrepancy of 3/4″ Found Not to be Unreasonable

In Furlong v. Cambridge (City), Mr. Justice M. Dale Parayeski dismissed the plaintiff’s action arising out of having tripped on a sidewalk owned by the defendant municipality. The plaintiff and her husband were walking to their daughter’s home. The plaintiff was wearing running shoes. She looked up towards her daughter’s house, to see if her grandchildren were in the window, and tripped over a height discrepancy where two concrete slabs met on the sidewalk. She fell, injuring her head and shoulder.

The plaintiff called expert evidence that such height discrepancies should not exceed one quarter of an inch. The discrepancy that caused the accident was as much as three-quarters of an inch. However, Justice Parayeski held that that did not offend the obligation imposed by s. 44(1) of the Municipal Act:

The municipality that has jurisdiction over a highway or bridge shall keep it in a state of repair that is reasonable in the circumstances, including the character and location of the highway or bridge.

Justice Parayeski said:

Here the height discrepancy, taken at its worst, might have been 3/4ths of an inch. This is not unreasonable given the fact that Saxony Circle is a quiet street lined with single family homes. The standard is not that of perfection. The standard suggested by the plaintiff’s expert, i.e that of keeping such height discrepancies to less than ¼ of an inch, is both unreasonable and unrealistic. It is worth noting that Mrs. Furlong herself did not expect sidewalks to be perfectly level.

His Honour also rejected the submission that the fact that the municipality took remedial measures after the accident constituted evidence of a state of non-repair. He remarked that while a court could draw this conclusion, it was not obliged to and he chose not to do so here.

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No “Semblance of Relevance” to Information about Insurer’s Claims Reserve

Lin v. Belair Insurance Company Inc. was an action for accident benefits consequent upon a serious motor vehicle accident. The plaintiff sought to compel production of some internal emails of the insurer, dealing with the setting of reserves for the claim. Counsel for the plaintiff argued that because breach of a duty of good faith had been alleged against the insurer, the emails were relevant to the issue of how the claim had been handled.

Master R.A. Muir rejected this submission, noting that “nothing in the pleadings suggests that the alleged bad faith on the part of the defendant somehow relates to or arises from the setting of the reserves. Information relating to the setting of reserves per se does not have a semblance of relevance.”

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New Rules Apply to Summary Judgment Motion Served in 2009 but Heard in 2010

This law will probably have a short shelf life, but it is topical right now. In Onex Corporation v. American Home Assurance, Justice Edward Belobaba has held that a motion for summary judgment that was served in 2009 but to be heard in 2010, now that the Rules of Civil Procedure have been substantially amended, will be governed by the new provisions.

A key influence on  Justice Belobaba’s decision was the fact that, unlike the amendments to the Rules that took place in 2004, this set of amendments contains no equivalent provision to s. 156(3) of the Courts of Justice Act, which read:  “the court … may order, subject to such terms as are considered just … that the proceeding be conducted under the [old rules] or make any other order that is considered just.”

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Court Finds Duty to Defend Action Based on Negligent Misrepresentation by Vendor of Home

UPDATE

The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from this decision on October 6, 2010, in very brief reasons: “It is uncontested that the appellant insurer has the onus to show that the exclusion is clearly and unambiguously operative. It cannot do that. The property here is not owned by the respondent although it once was. The exclusion cannot be read as if it was written both in the present tense and the past tense. It is in the present tense only.”

The other issues discussed in our original post were not addressed in the Court of Appeal’s decision and we’re not sure whether they arose in the course of argument.

ORIGINAL POST

In McGrimmon and Sholea v. The Personal Insurance Company, Mr. Justice Colin McKinnon had to decide whether a homeowner’s insurer owed a duty to defend insureds who had been sued by the purchaser of their home. The basis of the underlying action was that the vendors (Personal’s insureds) had sold to the plaintiffs a home which turned out to have numerous deficiencies. It was alleged that the home had been constructed negligently and that the vendors had misrepresented and failed to disclose to the plaintiff purchasers its true condition.

The Personal denied coverage to the vendors and a third party action was brought by the latter against the insurer.

The main action by the purchasers against the vendors was settled and the motion before Justice McKinnon was brought in the third party action. The vendors asked the court to find that their insurer, The Personal, owed a duty to defend them in the main action.

Justice McKinnon granted the motion and declared that The Personal owed a duty to defend.

The ruling will be of concern to insurers as it seems to extend liability coverage under a homeowner’s policy in a surprising way.

The insurer advanced the following arguments:

  1. in substance, the “occurrence” giving rise to the claim was one for breach of contract and breach of warranty, neither of which is covered by a homeowner’s policy; and
  2. the policy contained an exclusion for “damage to property you own, use or occupy” that negated coverage here.

Justice McKinnon rejected those arguments and found for the vendors/insureds. On the issue of the exclusion, counsel for The Personal argued that the “occurrence” giving rise to the claim was the representations made to the purchasers by the vendors while the latter still owned the house. McKinnon J. said, “were the exclusionary words cast in the past tense, I would agree” but that the exclusionary words must be interpreted in favour of the insured in the case of ambiguity.

It is not entirely clear to us what His Honour meant by his reference to “the past tense”, but based on earlier passages in his reasons, it appears that he would have given effect to the exclusion if it had read, “property you own, rent or occupy or had owned, rented or occupied”. He seems to have accepted the submission of counsel for the vendors/insureds, that the triggering event was the time the claim was made, with the result that the applicability of the exclusion was to be evaluated as of that time. By the time the claim was made, the property in question was no longer owned by the vendors and it seems to have been on this basis that His Honour concluded that the exclusion was inapplicable.

On the other issue, viz., whether the policy covered a claim that was, in substance, one for breach of contract, Justice McKinnon noted that the policy did not expressly exclude contractual liability and that, in any event, the “pith and substance” of the claim was for “negligence in general, negligent misrepresentation, negligent construction and negligent design. For these causes of action, the defendants are insured.”

We have some concerns about this decision although, in fairness, there might be some facts that are not recited in Justice McKinnon’s reasons for judgment that would address the points discussed below.

The first step in determining a coverage dispute is to look at the coverage afforded under the insuring agreement. Next, it is necessary to consider the extent to which coverage is withdrawn by policy exclusions. And finally, exceptions to exclusions must be looked at, since they have the effect of restoring coverage withdrawn by the exclusions.

Here, the insuring agreement said:

We will pay all sums which you become legally liable to pay as compensatory damages because of bodily injury or property damage.

You are insured for claims made against you arising from:

Personal liability – legal liability for unintentional body [sic] injury or property damage arising out of your personal actions anywhere in the world.

There is no suggestion, in the reasons, that there was any bodily injury suffered by the plaintiff purchasers. Assuming that to be so, the only other possibility is that there would be coverage for claims for compensatory damages because of property damage.

However, we do not see how the plaintiffs’ claim against the vendors could be said to be one for “compensatory damages because of property damage”. The reasons quote the overview paragraph of the statement of claim:

The Plaintiffs bring the within action with respect to the purchase and sale of the property; the faulty design and poor construction of the property; the negligent inspection of the property; the poor supervision of the design of the property; the inadequate repair and negligent regulation of the property; misrepresentations on the part of the defendant; the failure to disclose the condition of the property on the part of the defendants; and the breach of the defendants contractual duty of care, legislative, regulatory, fiduciary and other duties to the plaintiffs.

His Honour also said that “[t]he basis of the Plaintiffs’ claims is that after the closing date they discovered numerous defects and deficiencies with the house and the property.” Thus, it sounds like all of the damage to property complained of by the plaintiffs had already taken place prior to them having become the owners of the property. If so, the plaintiffs’ real claim was not for damage to their property, but for the economic loss that they had suffered by over-paying for an already-damaged house.

It seems to us therefore, that the claim against the insureds was not within the insuring agreement in the first place. There was no claim for compensatory damages for property damage; rather, the claim was for the economic loss that the plaintiffs suffered as a result of having been misled by the defendants about the pre-existing damage to the home. All of the “property damage” seems to have occurred while the defendants were still the owners. The liability of the defendants appears to have arisen not because they damaged someone else’s property but because of their failure to disclose the damage to their own property before selling it.

In the alternative, if it could be said that coverage was triggered under the insuring agreement, it seems to us that that coverage was withdrawn by the “property you own, use, occupy or lease” exclusion. When the property was damaged, it was owned by the insured. The subsequent transfer of the damaged property to the plaintiffs does not, in our view, vitiate the exclusion.

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Costs of $1,600 for Simplified Rules Trial

At the trial of Pitney Bowes of Canada v. Noia, 2009 CanLII 63372 (ON S.C.), Mr. Justice Douglas K. Gray awarded to the plaintiff damages of $13,400.57 which was slightly more than half of the amount that had been claimed. The action had been brought under Rule 76, which deals with simplified procedure.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity fees of $11,806.52 and disbursements of $1,553.53.

His Honour said that the claim for costs was “grossly excessive”. He said that many of the disbursements (which included searches, photocopies, courier, process server, binding combs, tabs, postage, and travel) had not been sufficiently particularlized and were, in any event, properly part of a law firm’s overhead.

As for the fees, Justice Gray said that he would have been inclined to award $2,000 if the claim had been fully successful. Since judgment had issued for only about half of the claim, he reduced that amount to $1,000 and reduced the disbursements from $1,553.53 to $600.

In making his ruling, His Honour relied on the proportionality principle that is now “encompassed within Rule 57.01(1)(0.b)”. He remarked that “The purpose of the Simplified Rules is to make small cases easier to manage, faster, and less expensive. If the Rules are to accomplish their objective, the Court must fix costs that are proportionate to what is at stake. If the plaintiff were to be compensated by the defendant for all of the costs claimed here, the objective of the Rules would be defeated.”

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Motions for Summary Judgment Must Be Made to Master

In Bensusan v. Ali, Mr. Justice Ted Matlow has ruled that motions for summary judgment must be made to a master, rather than to a judge, in jurisdictions where there are masters.

His Honour arrived at this conclusion by relying on rule 37.04, which reads: “A motion shall (emphasis added by Matlow J.) be made to the court if it is within the jurisdiction of a master or registrar and otherwise shall be made to a judge.”

In other words, because masters can hear motions for summary judgment, such motions must be heard by them. (Obviously, this would not apply to jurisdictions that do not have masters.)

His Honour dealt with a couple of possible counter-arguments. First of all  subrule 20.04(4) says, “Where the court is satisfied that the only genuine issue is a question of law, the court may determine the question and grant judgment accordingly, but where the motion is made to a master, it shall be adjourned to be heard by a judge.”

In Neighborhoods of Cornell Inc. v. 1440106 Ontario Inc., 2006 CanLII 37402 (ON S.C.), Master Calum MacLeod referred to subrule 20.04(4) as “a frequently misunderstood provision”. He interpreted it to mean that “if a point of law is unclear and it seems possible to determine it on a motion then the issue will be adjourned to a judge. In all other cases in which the law is clear and there is no genuine factual or legal issue, a master may grant summary judgment.” Justice Matlow’s intepretation is consistent with that of Master MacLeod. His Honour felt that it is not up to counsel bringing the motion to decide whether or not it involves a question of law that requires a judicial determination. Rather, “[b]y its terms, this rule leaves it to the master to decide whether “the only genuine issue is a question of law” and only the master can decide whether or not to adjourn the motion to be heard by a judge.”

This would suggest that a responding party can never successfully argue that a master lacks jurisdiction to hear a motion for summary judgment.

The other argument considered by Justice Matlow was that moving for summary judgment from a judge eliminates one level of appeal. His Honour said simply that “that is not a permissible option”.

Next year, of course, the Rules will change. There will be a sharper delineation between the powers of judges and masters in relation to Rule 20 motions. Judges, but evidently not masters, will have the following powers:

  1. Weighing the evidence.
  2. Evaluating the credibility of a deponent.
  3. Drawing any reasonable inference from the evidence. (see R. 20.04 (2.1))

Might that warrant bringing a motion for summary judgment before a judge? Stay tuned…

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Court Orders Production of Facebook Information in Accident Benefits Action

Wice v. Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company is another in a recently-emerging line of cases that have considered the extent to which a party has an obligation to produce information on his or her Facebook profile. This case involved a dispute about statutory accident benefits. Mr. Justice R. Cary Boswell followed the decision of Mr. Justice Brown in Leduc v. Roman and ordered the plaintiff to deliver a further and better affidavit of documents, listing relevant documents contained on his Facebook account or any other similar account. The plaintiff was also ordered to preserve information and documentation for the duration of the litigation.

His Honour reasoned that the litigation raised issues about the plaintiff’s ability to function in a variety of circumstances. He concluded that the Facebook documents depicted the plaintiff participating in social activities and that they were therefore relevant in the case. Justice Brown took a similar approach in Leduc.

These two decisions suggest that the courts are going to require that information contained on social network websites such as Facebook will be producible in personal injury lawsuits. What is less clear is what evidentiary foundation will have to be established by the opposing party, in order to obtain an order for production.

In Wice, the plaintiff’s Facebook site was a private or “closed” one, meaning that only those to whom the plaintiff had given permission could view the contents.

Nevertheless, the moving party was able to tender some evidence of the contents of the site. Justice Boswell said that “The Defendant has produced evidence demonstrating that there are relevant photographs of the Plaintiff participating in social activities posted on his Facebook profile.” It is unclear just what that evidence was or how the defendant came by it. In the ordinary course though, an opposing litigant might not be able to do more than speculate as to what information was contained on the plaintiff’s Facebook account. Justice Boswell seemed to rely, in part, on the evidence of what was on the plaintiff’s site. We wonder whether a defendant, in a case such as this one, should be required to adduce any evidence of the contents of the Facebook site or whether evidence of the site’s existence alone should suffice.

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Partial Indemnity = 55% of Actual Fees Billed?

Mr. Justice Timothy Ray held this summer, in Boyd v. Taj Mahal Stables Inc., that “Partial indemnity costs are generally measured as approximately 55% of the reasonable solicitor client account. The reason is that substantial indemnity costs are generally accepted to be approximately 85%, and are deemed to be 1.5 times the partial indemnity costs assessed in accordance with the guidelines and Rule 57.01.”

We weren’t aware that 55% and 85% respectively were the costs factors that the courts were using these days for partial and substantial indemnity costs. We have looked around and found two other cases in which the same approach was followed, although one was another decision of Justice Ray: Robinson v. Ottawa (Smith J.), Al-Enzi v. Gyukik (Ray J.)

On the other hand, these cases were all decided in Ottawa and might just be part of local initiatives to ameliorate the effects of the recession…

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